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International and Foreign Law North of the Border: 
The Canadian Constitutional Experience 
Drew S. Days, III* 
 [L]aw like technology is very much the fruit of human ex-
perience.  Just as very few people have thought of the 
wheel yet once invented its advantages can be seen and the 
wheel used by many, so important legal rules are invented 
by a few people or nations, and once invented their value 
can readily be appreciated, and the rules themselves 
adopted for the needs of many nations.1  
The question of the extent to which American judges should con-
sult foreign and international authorities has occupied Supreme Court 
Justices, members of Congress and legal commentators2 for the past 
several years.  This is evident in the opposing positions of the Justices 
in recent decisions on capital punishment and homosexual sodomy.3 
The question has also spawned a public debate between two Supreme 
Court Justices,4 as well as congressional proposals explicitly permitting 
federal judges to consult only domestic sources.5 
                                                                                                                           
 * Professor Drew S. Days, III is the Alfred M. Rankin Professor of Law at Yale University.   
 1 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 100 (2d 
ed. 1993). 
 2 Tim Wu, Foreign Exchange: Should the Supreme Court Care What Other Countries 
Think?, SLATE, Apr. 9, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2098559. 
 3 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that executions of mentally retarded 
criminals are cruel and unusual punishments prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that state law making it a crime for two persons of the same 
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid 
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes 
were committed). 
 4 See Press Release, Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Anto-
nin Scalia and Stephen Breyer (Jan. 13, 2005) available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/1352357/posts.  Justice Antonin Scalia: “[W]e don’t have the same moral and legal frame-
work as the rest of the world, and never have.  If you told the framers of the Constitution that 
[what] we’re after is to, you know, do something that will be just like Europe, they would have 
been appalled.”  Id.  Justice Stephen Breyer: “[O]f course foreign law doesn’t bind us . . . [b]ut 
these are human beings...who have problems that often, more and more, are similar to our own.  
They’re dealing with certain texts, texts that more and more protect basic human rights.  Their 
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At one level, the controversy over whether and, if so, to what ex-
tent foreign and international law should figure in the process of U.S. 
constitutional decision-making is rather surprising, given the Court’s 
past practice.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly cited to 
foreign and international rulings a decade ago in Washington v. Gluck-
sberg,6 where it rejected the claim that the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution “protects a right to commit suicide, which itself includes a 
right to assistance in doing so.”7  Included in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinion for the Court were references, among other sources, to a 1995 
report of the Senate of Canada and to a Supreme Court of Canada 
decision,8 which rejected a terminally ill plaintiff’s claim that she had a 
constitutional right to “physician-assisted suicide.”9  
But at a deeper level, the controversy has very serious conse-
quences, for I think that it presents the question of whether the U.S. is 
going to join a “global constitutional conversation” in which it has not 
desired to engage up to now.  Since World War II, a significant number 
of countries have dedicated themselves to writing modern constitu-
tional documents, embodying their fundamental commitments to hu-
man rights and human dignity and enforced by “constitutional courts” 
of varying structural design.10  To the extent that our Supreme Court 
wishes to overcome the powerful obstacle that American exceptional-
ism poses in this regard, I would suggest that Canada may provide a 
constructive model, for the Canadian Supreme Court has shown a 
remarkable ability to consider foreign courts’ jurisprudence, including 
that of the U.S., while, at the same time, remaining true to its own con-
stitutional values and history.11  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg seems to 
                                                                                                                           
societies more and more have become democratic and they’re faced . . . with some of the really 
difficult ones where there’s a lot to be said on both sides.”  Id. 
 5 H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (1st Sess.2005) (ex-
pressing the view that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the U.S. Constitution 
should not be based on determinations of foreign institutions “unless [they] inform an under-
standing of the original meaning of the Constitution of the United States”). 
 6 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 7 Id. At 723 
 8 Id. At 718, n. 15 & 16.  
 9 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 319. 
 10 Ruti Teitel, Transnational Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 
106 Yale L.J. 2009, 2060 n. 205 (1997) (noting the similarities between South Africa’s and Ger-
many’s postwar constitutions); D.M. Davis, Constitutional Borrowing: The Influence of Legal 
Culture and Local History in the Reconstitution of Comparative Influence: The South African 
Experience, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 181, 186-188 (2003) (noting that the South African Constitution 
contains numerous provisions and rights modeled after or copied from the constitutions of the 
U.S., Canada, Germany and Malaysia). 
 11 See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Two Supreme Courts: A Study in Contrast, in THE 
CANADIAN AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 149, 164 (Marian 
C. McKenna ed., 1993); Gerard V. La Forest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian 
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share this view.  In a recent interview, in response to a question sug-
gesting that U.S. judges' consultation of foreign law might be impro-
per, she said: “No one who sees the value of looking abroad suggests 
that a decision, say, of the Canadian Supreme Court would be binding 
on us; we read it for its persuasive value, for the quality of its reason-
ing.”12 
In so saying, she may have been implicitly acknowledging that 
Canada and the U.S. have much in common.  Former British colonies, 
both are predominantly English-speaking modern industrial societies.  
They are connected by innumerable commercial and economic rela-
tionships and share a several thousand-mile East-West border.  These 
commonalities raise at least the possibility that U.S. judges might prof-
it from consulting what their fellow judges "North of the Border" 
have to say on legal questions common to both countries.13  But I think 
that she may have meant more than that.  Perhaps she was acknowl-
edging the progressive role played by the Supreme Court of Canada 
over the past quarter-century under its late 20th Century basic consti-
tutional document. 
In 1982, Canada amended its 1867 Constitution (The British 
North America Act) by adding the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a 
document designed, first, to “constitutionalize” certain statutorily 
guaranteed individual rights protections.14  Second, it embodied in its 
constitution rights and freedoms recognized by Canada through its 
adherence to a number of international human rights accords.  Third, 
it borrowed features from other constitutional documents around the 
world, including selected provisions of the U.S. Bill of Rights.  Fourth, 
                                                                                                                           
Courts, 46 ME L. REV. 211, 216-220 (1994); Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, A Tool, Not a Master: The 
Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 1188, 1192-1209 
(2001). 
 12 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Paul Berman, An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1042 (2004).  
 13 See, e.g., Smithey, supra note 11, at 1205-1209 (using case law from the Canadian Su-
preme Court and African Constitutional Court to argue that judges rely on foreign precedent 
because of its utility in cutting information costs, decreasing uncertainty, and providing justifica-
tion). Professor Smithey argues: 
 
Faced with contentious arguments over new questions, judges found it useful to take 
advantage of the experience of other courts that had dealt with the same sorts of 
questions.  They found foreign and domestic precedent particularly useful when 
there were higher rates of disagreement and their need for justification was highest. 
 
Id. at 1207.  However, Professor Smithey went on to explain that “[r]ather than merely fol-
lowing foreign majority opinions, judges in Canada and South Africa have often found the logic 
of foreign dissenting opinions to be more persuasive.”  Id. at 1209.  
 14 Constitution Act, 1982 (schedule B) Charter of Rights & Freedoms [hereinafter Char-
ter]. 
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it moved Canada in significant respects from a system of parliamenta-
ry supremacy to one in which judicial review would play a central role 
in the interpretation and implementation of the Charter's provisions.15 
Moreover, in the course of drafting the Charter, Canadian par-
liamentarians held public hearings, and debated at great length the 
pros and cons of adopting provisions that paralleled those in our Bill 
of Rights.16  What resulted was a fundamental document that resem-
bles, in certain respects, U.S. provisions, while also differing in several 
notable respects.17  In particular, it affords protection for “life, liberty 
and the security of the person”18 (not “property”) – a difference which 
parliamentarians claim is meant to avoid the problems which their 
“neighbors to the South” (a phrase used by some parliamentarians) 
encountered with the legacy of Lochner v. New York19 and substantive 
due process.  Also, it contains a section that ensures both the right to 
equal protection and the right of the government to practice affirma-
tive action,20 so as to preempt any debate like those preceding and fol-
lowing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in The Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke.21  The Charter contains a provision gua-
ranteeing its rights and freedoms “equally to male and female per-
sons[,]”22 one that was included as a Canadian response to the failure 
in the U.S. of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).23 Another provi-
sion grants broad standing to anyone whose rights or freedoms have 
been infringed or denied.24 
Two other provisions, quite curious ones to most U.S. constitu-
tional scholars and political scientists must be mentioned.  The first is 
the non obstante or “notwithstanding” clause.25  In effect, it allows for 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Drew S. Days, III, Civil Rights in Canada: An American Perspective, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 
307, 328-338 (1984); Lorraine Weinrib, Canada’s Charter: Rights Protection in the Cultural Mo-
saic, 4 CARDOZO  J. INT’L & COMP. L. 395, 403-410 (1996). 
 16 Richard S. Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States, 7 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. 111, 150-153 (1984). 
 17 William Black, A Walk Through the Charter, in RIGHTING THE BALANCE: CANADA’S 
NEW EQUALITY RIGHTS, 47-81 (Lynn Smith et al. eds., 1986). 
 18 Charter, supra note 14, at §7. 
 19 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
 20 Charter, supra note 14, §15; Lovelace v. Ontario [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (Can.); Edward J. 
Iacobucci, Antidiscrimination and Affirmative Action Policies: Economic Efficiency and the Con-
stitution, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 293, 317-337 (1998); Stephen F. Ross, Charter Insights for Amer-
ican Equality Jurisprudence, 21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 227, 235-241 (2002). 
 21 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 22 Charter, supra note 14, at § 28. 
 23 2 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 52-55 & n. 241 (2005). 
 24 See Frank Iacobucci, The Supreme Court of Canada, Its History, Powers and Responsibil-
ities, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 27, 37-39 (2002). 
 25 Charter, supra note 14, at § 33.   
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the suspension of applications of certain Charter provisions for five 
years by action of the federal parliament or a provincial legislature.26 
The second, often referred to as a “reverse onus” clause, guaran-
tees the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter subject only to 
“such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably jus-
tified in a free and democratic society.”27 
One final feature of the Canadian constitutional framework is 
that the Supreme Court of Canada is authorized to render advisory 
opinions,28 something that the U.S. Supreme Court may not do, in view 
of the “case or controversy” requirement in Article III of the Consti-
tution.29 
At least at the rhetorical level, one of the complaints about the 
task of consulting relevant foreign precedents is that, even where they 
can be found, there is a rather low level of confidence that one suffi-
ciently understands the political, cultural and historical context out of 
which they emerged.30  But it is reasonable to think that such laments 
with respect to Canadian law have much less justification, given the 
history of the Charter’s development and its connection to U.S. law.  
Moreover, from a purely statistical perspective, the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in applying a modern Constitution to 20th 
and 21st Century problems reflect a clarity and directness in stating the 
nature of the problems before the Court and the reasoning of the con-
tending views of its Justices.31  Although it could probably not be oth-
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Barbara Billingsley, The Charter’s Sleeping Giant, 21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 
331 (2002); see also Tsvi Kahana, Understanding the Notwithstanding Mechanism, 52 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 221, 273 (2002). 
 27 Charter, supra note 14, at § 1; The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105; see also Vicki 
C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up the Conver-
sation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 606-611 (1999). 
 28 James L. Huffman & MardiLyn Saathoff, Advisory Opinions and Canadian Constitu-
tional Development: The Supreme Court’s Reference Jurisdiction, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1251, 1251 
(1990). 
 29 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 30 Insofar as Canada and the U.S. are concerned, a long-standing debate continues about 
the extent to which differences in histories and cultural values complicate efforts to draw reliable 
analogies between their constitutional jurisprudence.  See Stephen F. Ross, Charter Insights for 
American Equality Jurisprudence, 21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 227, 241-254 (2002).  Regarded 
as the seminal work in this respect is SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, CONSTITUTIONAL DIVIDE: THE 
VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 1-56 (1990) (arguing that the 
two cultures differ, among others, in their attitudes towards individual rights (U.S.) and commu-
nitarian values (Canada) that can be traced to the different paths each followed after the Ameri-
can Revolution). 
 31 This is not to suggest that the decision-making process and jurisprudence of the Su-
preme Court of Canada have been free of controversy, particularly with respect to the Court’s 
relationship with Parliament and the provincial legislatures.  See Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. 
Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 76-
78 (1997); see also Hon. Beverly McLachlin, Charter Myths, 33 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 23, 23 
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erwise, decisions of our Supreme Court, aided but often burdened by 
the perceived need of the Justices to reconcile and shore up their 
views by citation to over two centuries of precedent, may leave some 
readers with the impression that they just do not “get it.”32  One might 
conclude, however, given the differences described above, that neither 
the U.S. nor the Canadian Supreme Court will gain very much from 
considering the other’s constitutional jurisprudence.   
But that has not been the case in Canada.33  In interpreting its 
own Constitution, the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged a 
healthy tension between seeking assistance from U.S. jurisprudence 
while at the same time being fully cognizant that certain fundamental 
differences between the two countries argue against U.S. law provid-
ing any “quick fixes.”  As the Court said in The Queen v. Keegstra,34 its 
leading precedent on “hate speech”: 
 While it is natural and even desirable for Canadian courts 
to refer to American constitutional jurisprudence in seek-
ing to elucidate the meaning of Charter guarantees that 
have counterparts in the U.S. Constitution, they should be 
wary of drawing too ready a parallel between constitutions 
born to different countries in different ages and in very dif-
ferent circumstances . . . .35   
In that 1990 decision the Court upheld, in the face of a constitutional 
challenge, a criminal provision that penalized “everyone who, by 
communicating statements, other than in private conversation, willful-
ly promotes hatred against any identifiable group....”36 The Court did 
so, however, only after a thorough, sophisticated canvas of U.S. First 
                                                                                                                           
(1999); Christopher P. Manfredi, The Life of a Metaphor: Dialogue in the Supreme Court 1998-
2003, 23 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (2004); Christine A. Bateup, Expanding the Conversation: American 
and Canadian Experiences of Constitutional Dialogue in Comparative Perspective 44 (2006) 
(unpublished JSD Candidate Working Papers) (on file with New York University School of 
Law). 
 32 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 145-168 (1991) (arguing that U.S. rights jurisprudence would benefit if American 
lawyers and judges in difficult and novel cases examined important decisions of leading courts 
elsewhere). 
 33 See C.L. Ostberg et al., Attitudes, Precedents and Cultural Change: Explaining the Cita-
tion of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada, 34 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 377, 387 (2002) 
(noting that almost 30% of the cases decided between 1984 and 1995 cited U.S. authorities).  
Ostberg argues this is largely a result of “policy convergence” defined as “the tendency of socie-
ties to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performance ‘over 
time’ and policy emulation (or doctrinal convergence) between the Supreme Court and other 
courts, most notably the Supreme Court of the U.S.”  Id. at 377-78, 380. 
 34 See The Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 699,702. 
 35 Id., citing R. v. Rahey [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 639 (La Forest, J., concurring). 
 36 319 (2) of the Criminal Code of Canada R.S.C., 1985, c. (46). 
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Amendment jurisprudence with respect to “hate speech” in order to 
determine “the reasons why or why not American experience might 
be useful to its analysis.”37  Moreover, a dissenting Justice vigorously 
joined issue with the majority on the same American jurisprudential 
terrain.38 
In turn, Canada’s interpretation of its Charter provisions may of-
fer U.S. courts new ways of thinking about the degree to which our 
Equal Protection Clause might embrace a broader list of groups and 
rights than is presently the case;39 and how equal protection and affir-
mative action can live in harmony with one another.40  It may also, by 
offering a thoughtful “counterpoint” to the U.S. Supreme Court’s de-
cisions in the field of criminal law and national security, allow for 
more open and robust debate among our Justices in those respects.41    
In the field of criminal law, for example, the constitutionality of 
the use by law enforcement of thermal-imaging devices has occupied 
both the U.S. and Canadian Supreme Courts.  The former court found 
the practice unconstitutional in Kyllo v. United States,42 whereas the 
latter held it consistent with the search and seizure provision of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in R. v. Tessling.43  What is 
particularly notable is that the Canadian Supreme Court’s unanimous 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Keegstra, supra note 34.   
 38 See Kathleen Mahoney, The Canadian Constitutional Approach to Freedom of Expres-
sions in Hate Propaganda and Pornography, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 80-90 (1992).  See 
also Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of the American and Cana-
dian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech, WIS. L. REV. 1425, 1481-1514 (1994).  The 
Supreme Court of Canada followed a similar analytic approach in Hill v. Church of Scientology, 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130.  There, the Court was faced with the assertion that the common law of 
defamation should be modified in order to provide protection under the Charter for criticism of 
public officials.  After a thorough review of U.S. jurisprudence in this regard, the Court declined 
to adopt the “actual malice” standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).   
 39 See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 145 (grounds of 
discrimination enumerated in s. 15 (1) -- race, national origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental 
or physical disability -- are not exhaustive but may extend to “analogous” ones that are not 
enumerated).  See also Beatrice Vizkelety, Adverse Effect Discrimination in Canada: Crossing the 
Rubicon from Formal to Substantive Equality, in NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 22 (Loenen & Rodrigues eds., 1999). 
 40 See Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (“affirmative action” provision of Charter,          
s. 15(2) confirmatory and supplementary to its “equality” provision, s. 15(1)). 
 41 And although Canada does not have an Establishment Clause, a result of a constitution-
al compromise at the foundation of the Nation, the Canadian Supreme Court decisions speak 
with great force about the importance of freedom of religion.  See Donald L. Beschle, Does the 
Establishment Clause Matter? Non-Establishment Principles in the United States and Canada, 4 
PA. J. CONST. L. 451, 474-92 (2002); but see, Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (government 
funding of religious schools). 
 42 533 U.S. 27 (2001). “Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects 
emit but which is not visible to the naked eye.”  Id. at 29. 
 43 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (holding that use of such devices did not violate Charter, s. 8: “Every-
one has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.”). 
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opinion is devoted largely to setting out its disagreement with the rul-
ing in Kyllo and advancing arguments that echo those of the Kyllo 
dissent.  As it said there: 
The United States Supreme Court declared the use of 
FLIR [Forward-Looking Infra-Red] technology to image 
the outside of a house to be unconstitutional in Kyllo v. 
United States (citation omitted) based largely on the “sanc-
tity of the home.”  We do not go so far.  The fact that it was 
respondent’s home that was imaged using FLIR technolo-
gy is an important factor but it is not controlling and must 
be looked at in context and in particular, in this case, in re-
lation to the nature and quality of the information made 
accessible by FLIR technology to the police.44 
The U.S. Supreme Court might also profit from a series of rulings 
of the Supreme Court of Canada attempting to define the proper role 
of constitutional courts in reconciling the government’s anti-terrorism 
legislative and executive action, on the one hand, and fundamental 
protections of individual rights and liberties, on the other, given the 
intense, on-going legal controversies in that regard here at home.45  As 
the Canadian Court stated in a 2004 decision upholding an Anti-
Terrorism Act provision: 
The challenge for democracies in the battle against terror-
ism is not whether to respond, but rather how to do so.  
This is because Canadians value the importance of human 
life and liberty, and the protection of society through re-
spect for the rule of law.  Indeed a democracy cannot exist 
without the rule of law.  So, while Cicero long ago wrote 
“inter arma silent leges” (the laws are silent in battle) (cita-
tion omitted) we, like others, must strongly disagree.46 
In this and other decisions, both before and since the devastating 
terrorist attack upon the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions have been similarly con-
cerned with the values of judicial independence and the rule of law.47  
                                                                                                                           
 44 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 at ¶ 45. 
 45 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 
(2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F. 3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 3067 (2007). 
 46 Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, at 17 (valida-
tion of Anti-Terrorism Act restrictions on right to counsel).  
 47 See, e.g., The Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (holding that lower court judge applied 
the Anti-Terrorism Act incorrectly by conducting the investigation in secret instead of in accor-
dance with judicial openness principle and freedom of expression); Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 
S.C.R. 3 (upholding Anti-Terrorism Law by interpreting it according to Charter requirement of 
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As the foregoing reflects, The Supreme Court of Canada has now, 
for over two decades, attempted to engage the U.S. Supreme Court in 
dialogue by either openly adopting, rejecting, modifying, or critiquing 
major decisions of our Court with little or no acknowledgment here 
that this other constitutional voice even exists.  Only time will tell 
whether this “constitutional conversation” will ever get off the 
ground. 
But as the Canadian Supreme Court remarked in this respect: 
[T]he use of foreign material affords another source, 
another tool for the construction of better judgments.  Re-
course to such materials is, of course, not needed in every 
case, but from time to time a look outward may reveal re-
freshing perspectives.  The greater use of foreign materials 
by court and counsel in all countries can, I think, only en-
hance their effectiveness and sophistication.  In this era of 
increasing global interdependence and, in particular, of ev-
er closer American-Canadian relations, it seems normal 
that there should be sharing in and among our law and 
lawyers alike.48 
 
                                                                                                                           
robust procedural safeguards before deportation of suspected terrorist); Charkaoui v. Canada, 
[2007] S.C.R. 9 (holding that the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act’s provisions with 
respect to detention denied subject a fair hearing before an independent and impartial magi-
strate in violation of the Charter).   See generally Kent Roach, Ten Ways to Improve Canadian 
Anti-Terrorism Law, 51 CRIM. L. Q. 102 (2005) (arguing for reforms to ensure that Canada's 
response to terrorism is properly focused and proportionate); Kim Lane Schepple, North Ameri-
can Emergencies: The Use of Emergency Powers in Canada and the United States, 4 INT'L L. J. 
CONST. L. 213 (2006) (discussing divergent approaches of Canada and the U.S. to emergency 
powers from the 1970s to the present). 
 48 Gerard V. LaForest, The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. L. REV. 
211, 220 (1994). 
